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Abstract
This article is simultaneously a comparative law piece about prisoner disenfranchisement
in various countries, a transnational work of legal theory providing a framework for the use of
foreign law in domestic constitutional courts, and a domestic analysis of the constitutional
underpinnings of felon disenfranchisement.
The article begins in Parts II-III with a comprehensive comparative analysis of the recent
prisoner disenfranchisement decisions in Canada, South Africa, and Europe. It notes that the
over-arching theme in the decisions of all three courts, and of all the dissents, is to view the
acceptability of prisoner disenfranchisement along a continuum, where it becomes more
acceptable the more serious the offense committed. It is this continuum idea that informs the
latter parts of the article.
In Part IV, the article examines the growing phenomenon of a “transnational judicial
discourse” between domestic, foreign, and international courts. This examination carefully
distinguishes the more controversial universalist and genealogical interpretations of the
transnational judicial discourse from the less controversial dialogical interpretation of the
discourse which has been separately endorsed by six justices of the US Supreme Court. The
dialogical version of the transnational judicial discourse is less controversial because it is used
only to generate ideas which are then subject to conventional, domestic constitutional tests; it
does not import foreign doctrine. The article then examines the transnational judicial discourse as
it applies to felon disenfranchisement, suggesting that the concept of a continuum of applicability
taken from the international cases can inform the domestic debate on felon disenfranchisement.
The article synthesizes all of this material in Part V by revisiting the foundational
Supreme Court decision on felon disenfranchisement, Richardson v. Ramirez, in the context of
the transnational judicial discourse. Using the comparative law materials in a dialogical manner,
it applies the concept of a continuum of applicability for felon disenfranchisement to the US
context. Applying this concept functionally, it questions whether the framers in drafting the
words “or other crime” in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment were actually sanctioning
disenfranchisement for every kind of crime along the continuum of applicability. To answer this
question, it returns to the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, finding that the law
review Note relied on by the Ramirez Court is incorrect. While that Note claimed the words “or
other crime” emerged mysteriously from the black box of congressional committee, a review of
the legislative history shows they were actually contemplated in open session before entering
committee. This is significant, because the whole text of the plenary discussions has been
preserved, whereas the Committee discussions have not. Examining these plenary discussions, it
is clear that the words “or other crime,” when taken in their proper context, were meant to refer to
crimes of rebellion and disloyalty, particularly treason. With this new understanding of the
phrase, the article argues that section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be read as
affirmatively sanctioning the disenfranchisement of all felons; rather, the framers only intended
the disenfranchisement of those committing crimes of rebellion or disloyalty to the State, such as
treason.
With the textual barrier removed and the door open to a more nuanced constitutional
examination of felon disenfranchisement for various crimes, the article concludes by offering
some predictions on what a continuum of applicability of felon disenfranchisement would look
like under strict scrutiny analysis.
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I.

Introduction
After the Supreme Court held in Richardson v. Ramirez that Section 2 of the Fourteenth

Amendment affirmatively sanctioned felon disenfranchisement, there seemed little hope of
reconstructing a fruitful legal debate on the topic.1 Until very recently, it appeared that the
Ramirez decision was so inclusive, its textual reference so unforgiving, that the exception for
purposeful discriminatory intent enunciated in Hunter v. Underwood2 was the only possible
modification of Ramirez’s bright line. All of that has changed in recent years.
The debate over felon disenfranchisement is now stronger than ever. Federal appeals
courts in three separate circuits have all voiced their skepticism of felon disenfranchisement’s
compatibility with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). First, in Farrakhan v. Washington,
the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court grant of summary judgment for the State, holding that
“when felon disenfranchisement results in denial of the right to vote or vote dilution on account
of race or color, Section 2 [of the VRA] affords disenfranchised felons the means to seek
redress.”3 Second, although the decision was vacated pending a rehearing en banc,4 the Eleventh
Circuit decision in Johnson v. Bush announced a similar challenge to felon disenfranchisement
under the VRA.5

Third, the Second Circuit has for the past decade been considering the

1

Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974). See infra notes 120-121 and accompanying text
(discussing the opinion).
2
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231-33 (1985) (striking down Alabama’s felon disenfranchisement
regime because its "original enactment was motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account
of race and the section continues to this day to have that effect.").
3
Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003), rehearing en banc denied, 359 F.3d 1116
(2004). Although the district court characterized “Plaintiffs' evidence of discrimination in Washington's
criminal justice system and the resulting disproportionate impact on minority voting power as
‘compelling,’” it granted summary judgment for the State because the discrimination in question originated
in the criminal justice system, external to the voting qualification itself. The court thus reasoned that the
voting qualification furthered, but did not cause, the disproportionate impact. Id. at 1014, 1017. In
reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit held that under the “totality of the circumstances” test, even if
the “the cause of [the] disparate impact on [minorities’] right to vote was external to the felon
disenfranchisement provision itself, … [the felon disenfranchisement scheme] could provide the requisite
causal link between the voting qualification and the prohibited discriminatory result.” Id. at 1011.
4
Johnson v. Bush, 377 F.3d 1163 (2004) (order for rehearing en banc).
5
Johnson v. Bush, 353 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003). The district court granted of summary judgment for the
State, establishing a presumption that “the re-enactment of the felon disenfranchisement provision in
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narrower question of whether currently imprisoned felons have a claim under Section 2 of the
VRA. In Baker v. Pataki, an en banc panel split 5-5 over the question.6 More recently in
Muntaqim v. Coombe, a three-judge panel held Section 2 of the VRA inapplicable to the state
disenfranchisement statute because such an application would “alter the constitutional balance
between the States and the Federal Government” and Congress had not given a “clear statement”
of such an intent.7

This did not end discussion on the issue, however; it was reborn last

December when the Second Circuit granted rehearing en banc.8
The debate over felon disenfranchisement is definitely no less alive in legislative halls,
with the changes since 2000 alone enough to paint a very active picture. Just as the court rulings
are generally favorable to those advocating for felon voting rights – reopening a debate long
silenced by Ramirez – the recent legislative action is also almost completely favorable to
increased felon voting. In Alabama, a conservative governor “signed legislation making it easier
for ex-offenders to regain their voting rights.”9 Legislatures in Delaware and Maryland altered
their laws to automatically restore the franchise to ex-felons after a post-sentence wait, subject to
some exceptions; the Nevada legislature eliminated its five-year wait to apply for restoration of
rights; Connecticut enfranchised probationers; and New Mexico ceased the disenfranchisement of
ex-felons. The only exception to this trend was Massachusetts, which voted to disenfranchise

[Florida’s] 1968 [Constitution] cleansed Florida's felon disenfranchisement scheme of any invidious
discriminatory purpose that may have prompted its inception in Florida's 1868 Constitution.” Johnson v.
Bush, 214 F. Supp 2d 1333, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2002). The Eleventh Circuit reversed, refocusing the burden
on the state to prove the 1968 constitution was free of discriminatory intent, and finding no nondiscriminatory reason in the record for retaining the felon-disenfranchisement provisions in the
constitution. 353 F.3d at 1301.
6
Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996).
7
366 F.3d 102, 130 (2d Cir. 2004). Rehearing en banc denied, Muntaqim v. Coombe, 385 F.3d 793 (2d
Cir. 2004); cert. denied, Muntaqim v. Coombe, 125 S. Ct. 480 (2004); rehearing en banc granted,
Muntaqim v. Coombe, 396 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2004).
8
Muntaqim v. Coombe, 396 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2004).
9
Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, representation, and the Debate over Felon
Disenfranchisement, Stanford Law School Working Paper No. 75, p. 1, available online at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pubs_05.cfm (last accessed Mar. 2, 2005).
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inmates.10 A bill was also introduced in the U.S. Congress which would guarantee the right to
vote in federal elections to all former felons who at the time of the election are no longer “serving
a felony sentence in a correctional institution or facility.”11

Moreover, support for felon

disenfranchisement in the public is falling. One recent survey found that “over eighty percent of
Americans believe that ex-offenders should regain their right to vote at some point, and more than
forty percent would allow offenders on probation or parole to vote.”12
There are many good reasons for this increased skepticism of felon disenfranchisement.
First, the Circuit Court decisions cited above raise an important question regarding the potential
role of felon disenfranchisement in race-based voting discrimination. Second, some argue that
felon disenfranchisement should be revisited because small margins of victory in recent elections
make prison populations a potential swing vote.13 Third, many commentators maintain that felon
disenfranchisement frustrates fair redistricting principles by counting prisoners for redistricting
purposes but then not counting their vote.14 None of these is the focus of this article. Rather than
add one more voice to the masses which are arguing, in various ways, that felon
disenfranchisement is wrong because of its functional outcomes, this article returns to the
10

Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Summary of Changes to State Disenfranchisement Laws, 1865-2003
(April, 2003), online at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pubs_05.cfm (last accessed Mar. 2, 2005).
11
H.R. 259, Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 2003, § 3 (108th Congress, 1st Sess., Jan. 8, 2003).
12
Karlan, supra note 9, at 1.
13
See, e.g., Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon
Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, 67 AM. SOCIO. REV. 777, 792, 794 (2002) (using empirical
evidence to prove that the 2000 presidential election “would almost certainly have been reversed had voting
rights been extended to any category of disenfranchised felons,” that felon disenfranchisement altered the
outcome of as many as seven recent senate races, and that Democrats would likely have gained and kept
majority control of the Senate from 1986 to the present in the absence of felon disenfranchisement).
14
See, e.g., LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINOR’S CANARY 189-90, 265 (2002) (“The strategic
placement of prisons in predominantly white rural districts often means that these districts gain more
political representation based on the disenfranchised people in prison, while the inner-city communities
these prisoners come from suffer a proportionate loss of political power and representation.”); Rosanna M.
Taormina, Defying One-Person, One-Vote: Prisoners and the “Usual Residence” Principle, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 431 (2003) (arguing that the “’usual residence’ principle, as applied to disenfranchised prisoners and
former prisoners, cannot be squared with the Supreme Court's one-person, one-vote jurisprudence”); Brief
Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant Jalil Abdul Muntaqim, aka Anthony Bottom, Urging
Reversal of the District Court, on Behalf of National Voting Rights Institute and Prison Policy Initiative,
01-7260, submitted to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, available at
http://www.nvri.org/about/new_york_state_policies.shtml (last accessed Mar. 2, 2005) (arguing that the
Court should consider the redistricting implications of disenfranchisement as part of the “totality of
circumstances” that must be examined in addressing the plaintiff’s Voting Rights Act claim).
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forgotten argument that felon disenfranchisement is substantively wrong in itself.

As a

constitutional matter, this argument has been foreclosed by the textual holding in Ramirez that the
14th Amendment of United States Constitution affirmatively sanctioned the practice. This article
argues for a reconsideration of that premise. It does so by approaching the key phrase “or other
crime” in section 2 of the 14th Amendment and re-examining whether the Framers truly intended
that phrase to create the blanket disenfranchisement which it has come to support.
Courts in South Africa, Canada, and Europe have all recently examined the practice of
prisoner disenfranchisement,15 concluding in their respective jurisdictions that the practice, if
appropriate at all, is appropriate only for the most serious crimes and never once the prison term
is complete. By engaging this international jurisprudence, this article follows the increasingly
popular model of the “transnational judicial discourse” to make use of the ideas raised by the
foreign courts, but not their doctrine or constitutional tests. Although a voluminous body of
literature exists criticizing felon disenfranchisement,16 and although some scholars have
compared the U.S. situation to one other country,17 no scholar has yet synthesized all of the recent
domestic and international decisions into one analysis. Similarly, although some commentators
have attempted to reopen the constitutional inquiry after Ramirez,18 no scholar has done so by a
reinterpretation of the word “crime” in Section 2 of the 14th Amendment. This article attempts
both of these goals.

15

The international courts discussed in this study refer to “prisoner disenfranchisement,” rather than “felon
disenfranchisement.” I retain the distinction for clarity to help distinguish whether I am speaking of
domestic or international practice. The term “prisoner disenfranchisement” used in the international
jurisdictions is also narrower and more appropriate to those jurisdictions, because it does not contemplate
any possibility of disenfranchising former prisoners.
16
See, e.g., works cited at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pubs_05.cfm (last accessed Mar. 2, 2005)
(which represents just the tip of the iceberg).
17
See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Continuing Payment on One's Debt to Society: The German Model of
Felon Disenfranchisement as an Alternative, 84 MINN. L. REV. 753 (2000); Debra Parkes, Ballot Boxes
Behind Bars: Toward the Repeal of Prisoner Disenfranchisement Laws, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 71 (2003).
18
See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the
Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment? 92 GEO. L.J. 259 (2004); Karlan,
supra note 9 (arguing that felon disenfranchisement violates the 8th Amendment ban on cruel and unusual
punishment).
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In Part II, I undertake a descriptive analysis of the recent prisoner disenfranchisement
decisions in Canada, South Africa, and Europe. In the Canadian context, I contrast a unanimous
decision of the Supreme Court in 1993 finding a blanket disenfranchisement of all prisoners
unconstitutional with a much closer 5-4 decision in 2002 invalidating a disenfranchisement law
limited to inmates serving sentences of two years or more.

In South Africa, the new

Constitutional Court after extensive reference to the Canadian decisions held by a 9-2 vote that a
provision denying the right to vote to prisoners serving sentences without the option of a fine was
unconstitutional. Finally, the European Court of Human Rights, also after examination of the
Canadian case, unanimously concluded that a British law denying the vote to all prisoners,
irrespective of the length of their sentence or gravity of their offense, violated Protocol No. 1 to
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of
Europe.
In Part III, I undertake a comparative analysis of the international decisions. I conclude
that the decisions differ in six principle ways. First, the extent of prisoner disenfranchisement
was different in each case. Second, the government justifications for prisoner disenfranchisement
varied. Third, the courts were not uniform in the level of constitutional scrutiny they applied to
prisoner disenfranchisement.

Fourth, the cases accorded varying levels of attention to

comparative law materials. Fifth, the cases enjoyed differing levels of agreement among the
justices. Sixth, although all three Courts applied a similar test of constitutional scrutiny, each
court’s final holding rested on a different stage in that inquiry. I then consider two principle and
important similarities between the decisions. First, all three courts relied on an astonishingly
similar test of constitutional scrutiny. Second, and most important, the over-arching theme in the
analysis of all three courts, and of all the dissents, was to view the acceptability of prisoner
disenfranchisement along a continuum, where it becomes more acceptable the more serious the
offense committed. It is this important idea that informs the latter Parts of this article.

7

In Part IV, I discuss the growing phenomenon of a “transnational judicial discourse.”
First, I discuss this discourse generally as it has been understood by justices of the United States
Supreme Court. This examination carefully distinguishes the more controversial universalist and
genealogical interpretations of the transnational judicial discourse from less controversial
dialogical interpretation of the discourse which has been separately endorsed by six of the Court’s
current justices. The dialogical version of the transnational judicial discourse is less controversial
because it is used only to generate ideas which are then subject to conventional, domestic
constitutional tests; it absolutely does not import foreign doctrine.

Second, I examine the

transnational judicial discourse as it applies to felon disenfranchisement, returning to my
conclusions in Part III and suggesting that the international cases are useful because of their
notion of a continuum of applicability of prison disenfranchisement based on the seriousness of
the offense.
The article synthesizes all of this material in Part V by revisiting Richardson v. Ramirez
in the context of the transnational judicial discourse. Using the comparative law materials in a
dialogical manner (to stimulate ideas, not import doctrine), it applies the concept of a continuum
of applicability for felon disenfranchisement to the U.S. context.

Applying this concept

functionally, it questions whether the framers in drafting the words “or other crime” in section 2
of the Fourteenth Amendment were actually referring to every kind of crime along the continuum
of applicability. To answer this question, it returns to the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment, finding that the law review Note relied on by the Ramirez Court is incorrect. While
that Note claimed the words “or other crime” emerged mysteriously from the black box of
congressional committee, a review of the legislative history shows they were actually
contemplated in open session before entering committee. This is significant, because the whole
text of the plenary discussions has been preserved, whereas the Committee discussions have not.
Examining these plenary discussions, it is clear that the words “or other crime” when taken in
their proper context, were meant to refer to crimes of rebellion and disloyalty, particularly

8

treason. With this new understanding of the phrase, section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment thus
only affirmatively sanctions the disenfranchisement of those committing crimes of rebellion or
disloyalty to the State, such as treason. With the textual bar now removed with respect to most
crimes, felon disenfranchisement can thus be examined through means-end constitutional scrutiny
as has become the practice for other first-generation voting rights issues. The Part concludes with
a substantive application of the continuum of applicability of felon disenfranchisement. With the
textual barrier removed and the door open to a more nuanced constitutional examination of felon
disenfranchisement for various crimes, the Part offers some predictions on what a continuum of
applicability of felon disenfranchisement would look like under strict scrutiny analysis. The
article concludes that the time has come to revisit the original textual premise in Ramirez, accept
a narrower reading of section 2 of the 14th Amendment, and develop a more nuanced approach to
the applicability of felon disenfranchisement.

II.

Descriptive Summary of International Decisions
a. Canada
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states in s.3 that “Every citizen of Canada

has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative
assembly and to be qualified for membership therein.”19 Nevertheless, a Canadian law passed in
1985 prohibited prisoners from voting while in prison, regardless of the length of their
sentences.20 That law was challenged in the 1993 case of Sauvé v. Canada (Sauvé 1), and the
Supreme Court held unanimously that such a blanket ban was an unconstitutional denial of the
right to vote guaranteed by s. 3.21 The Canadian Parliament responded to that decision by
replacing the blanket prisoner disenfranchisement law with a new law denying the right to vote
19
20

CANADIAN CHARTER RTS & FREEDOMS, S.3.

Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2 , ss. 51(e) [rep. & sub. 1993, c. 19, s. 23(2)], 51.1
[ad. idem, s. 24].

21

Sauvé v. Canada (Attorney General), 2 S.C.R. 438 (1993) (hereinafter “Sauvé 1”).

9

only to inmates serving sentences of two years or more, codified in s. 51(e) of the Canada
Elections Act22 The reformulated law produced new litigation, leading in 2002 to the important
decision in the area of prisoner disenfranchisement announced in Sauvé v. Canada (Sauvé 2).23
In Sauvé 2, the Crown conceded that s. 51(e) of the Canada Elections Act presumptively
violated the voting rights provision of s. 3 of the Charter; thus, the Supreme Court proceeded
directly to constitutional justification analysis.24 It stated that “the government bears the burden
of proving a valid objective and showing that the rights violation is warranted -- that is, that it is
rationally connected, causes minimal impairment, and is proportionate to the benefit achieved.”25
Although the word “rational” is used, the addition of the minimal impairment and proportionality
tests suggests that the majority’s formulation corresponds to some level of heightened scrutiny
analysis in American constitutional jurisprudence. Moreover, the majority clearly distinguishes
the more deferential approach taken by the dissent, noting that “[t]he right to vote is fundamental
to our democracy and the rule of law and cannot be lightly set aside. Limits on it require not
deference, but careful examination.”26
Proceeding to the application of the test, the Court noted that the government asserted
two objectives for the denial of prisoner voting rights: (1) to enhance civic responsibility and
respect for the rule of law; and (2) to provide additional punishment, enhancing the general
purposes of the criminal sanction.27 Expressing criticism at the broad nature of these objectives,28

22
23

s. 51(e) (S.C. 1993, c. 19, s. 23).

Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 3 S.C.R. 519, 2002 S.C.C 68 (2002) (hereinafter “Sauvé 2”).
24
The basis for Constitutional scrutiny under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is established
in its S.1: “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society. Constitutional review under this article is a two-part means-ends inquiry known as the
Oakes test for the case in which it was developed: “To justify the infringement of a Charter right, the
government must show that the infringement achieves a constitutionally valid purpose or objective, and that
the chosen means are reasonable and demonstrably justified.” R. v. Oakes, 1 S.C.R. 103 (1986).
25
Sauvé 2, supra note 23, at para. 7.
26
Id. at para. 8.
27
Id. at para. 21.
28
The Court was highly critical of the general nature of these objectives, stating that “people should not be
left guessing about why their Charter rights have been infringed.”28 In this regard, it noted that the first
objective “could be asserted of virtually every criminal law and many non-criminal measures” and that the
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the Court proceeded to the first prong of Canadian constitutional scrutiny, determining whether a
rational connection exists between the stated objectives and the denial of prisoner voting. The
Government had advanced three theories in support of this rational connection: (1) that depriving
prisoners of the vote sends an "educative message" about the importance of respect for the law to
both prisoners and the society at large; (2) that allowing penitentiary inmates to vote "demeans"
the political system; and (3) that disenfranchisement is a legitimate form of punishment,
regardless of the nature of the crime or circumstances of the offender.29
First, the Court dismissed the “educative message” theory as bad pedagogy, stating that
“denying penitentiary inmates the right to vote is more likely to send messages that undermine
respect for the law and democracy than messages that enhance those values”30 because it is in
such stark contrast to “Canada's steady march to universal suffrage,”31 taking Canada “backwards
in time and retrench[ing] … democratic entitlements.”32 Second, the Court also dismissed the
government’s argument that prisoner voting was demeaning to the political system, stating that
such an argument was premised on the idea of voting as privilege rather than right and in the
concept of civil death, both of which rendered obsolete by s. 3.33 Finally, the Court also
dismissed the government’s third argument, reasoning that a blanket prisoner disenfranchisement
was arbitrary and concluding that it fulfilled none of the traditional goals of imprisonment:
deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and denunciation.34

second objective was also vague because Parliament had not clarified how, exactly, such a punishment
would enhance the criminal sanction. Sauvé 2, supra note 23, at paras. 24-24.
29
Id. at para. 29.
30
Id. at para. 41.
31
Id. at para. 33.
32
Id.
33
Id. at paras. 42-44.
34
Id. at paras. 48-53. The Court quickly reached this conclusion with regard to deterrence and
rehabilitation, stating that “[n]either the record nor common sense supports the claim that
disenfranchisement deters crime or rehabilitates criminals. On the contrary, as Mill recognized long ago,
participation in the political process offers a valuable means of teaching democratic values and civic
responsibility.” Id. at para. 49. The Court concludes that prisoner disenfranchisement could not
legitimately further the goals of retribution and denunciation because a blanket disenfranchisement was not
individually tailored enough to necessarily reflect the moral culpability of the individual prisoner or the
crime committed. Id. at para. 50.

11

Because the Court found no rational connection between prisoner disenfranchisement and
the government’s three objectives, it did not need to proceed to the minimum impairment or
proportionality inquiries, although it stated in dicta that a bright line disenfranchising all prisoners
with sentences of two years or more would be highly suspect under both of these tests.35 The
Court likewise did not consider the alternative argument that prisoner disenfranchisement
infringes the equality guarantee of Charter s. 15(1).36

Thus, the Canadian Supreme Court

concluded by a 5-4 vote that prisoner disenfranchisement applicable to all prisoners while they
serve a sentence of two years or more was unconstitutional.
A fifty page dissent argued that because the constitutional question rested on
“philosophical, political and social considerations which are not capable of ‘scientific proof,’” it
was appropriate to give Parliament significant deference.37

After a lengthy discussion of

criminology and penology and overview of international trends in prisoner disenfranchisement,
the dissent found both of the government’s objectives to be pressing and substantial.38 The
relaxed, deferential scrutiny of the dissent is especially clear in its minimal impairment and
proportionality inquiries, which presented no significant challenge at all to the impugned
provisions.39

The dissent concluded that “[w]hile it has been conceded that [the

disenfranchisement law] does infringe s. 3 of the Charter, the infringement is a reasonable limit
that is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”40

b. South Africa
The 1996 South African Constitution states in section 19(3)(a) that “[e]very adult citizen
has the right … to vote in elections for any legislative body established in terms of the

35

Id. at paras. 54-62.
Id. at para. 63.
37
Id. at para. 67.
38
Id. at para. 148.
39
Id. at paras. 160-77.
40
Id. at para. 207.
36
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Constitution.”41

In the early years of the new constitution, the relationship between this

provision and prisoner disenfranchisement was unclear, because no law existed outright denying
prisoners the right to vote. In August and Another v. Electoral Commission and Others, the
Constitutional Court of South Africa held that the Electoral Commission could not disenfranchise
prisoners by failing to accommodate prison voting, but it did not reach the hypothetical question
of whether affirmative legislation disenfranchising prisoners would withstand constitutional
scrutiny.42 In response to this case, the South African legislature enacted the Electoral Laws
Amendment Act,43 amending the Electoral Act44 so as to clearly disenfranchise in section
24(B)(2) all prisoners serving sentences of imprisonment without the option of a fine.45 The Act
further disenfranchises prisoners who have already been released on election day by preventing
them in section 8(2)(f) from registering as voters once in prison.46 In the weeks leading up to
national and provincial legislative elections in South Africa in 2004, the provisions were
challenged as a matter of urgency in the case of Minister of Home Affairs v. National Institute for
Crime Prevention and the Re-Integration of Offenders (NICRO) and others (hereinafter
“NICRO”).47
Constitutional scrutiny in South Africa is governed by section 36 of the Constitution and
cases interpreting it.48 That section provides that constitutional rights can only be limited if

41

CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA, SEC. 19(3)(a).
1999 (3) SA 1 (CC); 1999 (4) BCLR 363 (CC).
43
Act 34 of 2003.
44
Act 73 of 1998.
45
Minister of Home Affairs v. National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-Integration of Offenders
(NICRO) and others, case CCT 03/04 (Mar. 3, 2004). According to the Director-General of Home Affairs
of South Africa, “it was appreciated that in the [sic] light of this judgment, unless the position of prisoners
was addressed in legislation, arrangements would have to be made for them to vote.” NICRO, supra, at
para. 43.
46
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“reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality
and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including the nature of the right; the
importance of the purpose of the legislation; the nature and extent of the limitation; the relation
between the limitation and its purpose; and less restrictive means to achieve that purpose.”49 The
presence of the less-restrictive means component suggests a form of heightened scrutiny.
Applying the section 36 test, the NICRO Court first examined the three purposes for the
legislation put forth by the government. The first purpose advanced was an effort to maintain the
“integrity of the voting process.” Under this rationale, because all attempts to accommodate
special categories of voters through efforts such as mobile voting stations involved risks of
interference or tampering, such special arrangements should be limited. If such efforts had to be
limited, the government argued that it was more legitimate to disenfranchise prisoners than any
other voter who would be unable to travel to standard polling stations, such as disabled voters,
pregnant voters, or absentee voters.50

The Court rejected this argument, questioning the

connection between accommodation of other groups and accommodation of prisoners; it
concluded that “[t]he mere fact that it may be reasonable not to make special arrangements for
particular categories of persons who are unable to reach or attend polling stations on election day
does not mean that it is reasonable to disenfranchise prisoners.”51 The government’s second
proposed purpose was the effort to minimize the cost of the voting process. Like its “integrity of
the voting process” argument, it submitted that because costs were prohibitively high to
accommodate all classes of special-needs voters, prisoners were the most legitimate class of
voters to disenfranchise.52 The Court wholly rejected this argument, stating that “[t]here is
nothing to suggest that expanding … arrangements to include prisoners sentenced without the
2001 (4) SA 491 (CC); 2001 (8) BCLR 765 (CC) para. 19; Phillips and Another v Director of Public
Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local Division and Others 2003 (3) SA 345 (CC); 2003 (4) BCLR 357 (CC)
para. 20.
49
CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA, SEC. 36(1).
50
NICRO, supra note 45, at paras. 40-41.
51
Id. at para. 53.
52
Id. at paras. 47-49.
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option of a fine will in fact place an undue burden on the resources of the Commission. … In so
far as this aspect of the case is concerned, the burden of justifying the limitation falls at the first
hurdle and it is not necessary to engage in the proportionality analysis that would have been
necessary if the factual underpinning for the contention based on lack of resources had been
established.”53 The third purpose of disenfranchisement proposed by the government was to send
a message to the public that the government was tough on crime, a message which both
denounced crime and showed that citizens’ rights are connected to their duties.54 After extensive
analysis of the Canadian Sauvé 2 case, which turned on a similar policy issue,55 the Court
concluded that
the present case is markedly different from Sauvé [2]. The main thrust of the
justification in the present case was directed to the logistical and cost issues
which cannot be sustained. The policy issue has been introduced into the case
almost tangentially. In contrast, the detailed record in the second Sauvé case
contained evidence which addressed the issues relevant to the policy decisions to
disenfranchise prisoners, and the purpose that it would serve. In the present case
we have only statements such as that made by counsel that the government does
not want to be seen to be soft on crime, and that … it would be unfair to others
who cannot vote to allow prisoners to vote. … In short, we have wholly
inadequate information on which to conduct the limitation analysis that is called
for.56
After rejecting all three of the government’s proposed purposes, the Court thus held that
disenfranchising all prisoners serving sentences without the option of a fine was unconstitutional.
This being the case, it did not proceed to examine the second claim proposed by the applicants,
that prisoner disenfranchisement violated the right to equality.57
A dissenting opinion by Justice Madala agreed with the majority that the provisions
presumptively violated the constitutional right to vote, but disagreed on the justification analysis.
Madala argued that the multi-pronged objectives of the government must be “read holistically as
an attempt by government to inculcate responsibility in a society which, for decades, suffered the
53

Id. at paras. 49-51.
Id. at para. 55-57.
55
See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
56
NICRO, supra note 45, at paras. 66-67.
57
Id. at para. 68.
54

15

ravages of apartheid.”58 In this regard, Madala criticized the majority’s reliance on the Canadian
Sauvé 2 case, arguing that South Africa’s unique and tainted past required “uniquely South
African solutions and that one cannot simply import into a South African situation a solution
derived from another country.”59 This argument is unsatisfying: whereas the connection between
apartheid and prisoner disenfranchisement is not self-evident, the similarities between the Sauvé 2
case and the present case are difficult to deny. Another dissenting opinion by Justice Ngcobo
similarly agreed with the majority that the impugned provisions were presumptively invalid, but
went on to conclude that the government had a legitimate interest in denouncing crime and
promoting observance of civic duties and obligations.60 Nevertheless, Ngcobo concluded that the
limitation on the right to vote was overbroad because it also applied to prisoners awaiting the
outcome of an appeal, who were potentially innocent.61 Ngcobo would solve this problem by
reading the phrase “serving a sentence of imprisonment without the option of a fine” to exclude
prisoners awaiting appeal.62

c. European Court of Human Rights
Just three weeks after the South African Constitutional Court reached its decision in
NICRO, the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “ECHR”) also made a landmark ruling
in the area of prisoner disenfranchisement. In the case of Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2),63 the
ECHR considered a British law which disenfranchised all prisoners, regardless of their crime, for
the entire time they are in prison.64 The main question in the case was whether the prisoner
disenfranchisement law violated Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection
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of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe, which states: “The High
Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under
conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the
legislature.”65
After an extensive review of both the majority and dissenting opinions in the Canadian
Sauvé 2 case,66 the Court proceeded to its examination of the tension between the British prisoner
disenfranchisement law and Art. 3 of the Protocol. It examined this tension under the test
established in Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium: “[The Court] has to satisfy itself that the
conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence
and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and
that the means employed are not disproportionate.”67 The Mathieu-Mohin test appears slightly
relaxed in comparison to the scrutiny used in Canada or South Africa because although similar in
all other respects, it does not mention minimum impairment. Nevertheless, the Court was
unwilling to entertain a level of scrutiny as relaxed as that proposed by the United Kingdom.
When the British government argued that “under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 the right to vote was
not absolute and that a wide margin of appreciation [relaxed scrutiny] was to be allowed to
Contracting States,”68 the Court responded that although a margin of appreciation did exist, “the
Court does not consider that a Contracting State may rely on the margin of appreciation to justify
restrictions on the right to vote which have not been the subject of considered debate in the
legislature and which derive, essentially, from unquestioning and passive adherence to a historic
tradition.”69
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The British government submitted two objectives in support of the prisoner
disenfranchisement law. First, the law served to prevent crime and punish offenders; second, it
operated “to enhance civil responsibility and respect for the rule of law ‘by depriving those who
have seriously breached the basic rules of society of the right to have a say in the way such rules
are made for the duration of their sentence.’”70 These aims had both been accepted as legitimate
in the case law of the European Commission for Human Rights, a predecessor to the ECHR.71
Relying heavily on the Canadian Sauvé 2 decision,72 the Court however was deeply skeptical
about both objectives. First, the Court was concerned about the government’s ‘deter and punish’
objective in light of the fact that “the loss of the right to vote plays no overt role in the sentencing
process in criminal cases in the United Kingdom.”73 Second, the Court was also deeply skeptical
of the British government’s objective of enhancing civil responsibility and respect for the rule of
law, stating that “there is no clear, logical link between the loss of vote and the imposition of a
prison sentence, where no bar applies to a person guilty of crimes which may be equally antisocial or ‘uncitizen-like’ but whose crime is not met by such a consequence.”74 Despite these
concerns, the Court did not decide the case on this basis, preferring to leave this as dicta and
strike down the law based on its lack of proportionality.75 In this regard, the Court held that an
indiscriminate blanket disenfranchisement of all prisoners, irrespective of their crime or length of
their imprisonment, could not possibly withstand the proportionality test. The Court emphasized
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that a blanket ban was overly-arbitrary, because a person serving a mere week-long prison
sentence would be disenfranchised if an election happened to fall during that week. The Court
then considered the particular situation of the applicant, who was from a strategic perspective
certainly the “ideal plaintiff.” The applicant in the case “was a man with a gross personality
disorder to such a degree that he was amoral.”76 He had completed his sentence, and was being
detained solely because his personality disorder made him a potential danger to society. The
Court found it impossible to accept that a law premised on punishment but which catches such a
case within its reach could be considered proportional.77 Finally, the Court found “no evidence
that the legislature in the United Kingdom has ever sought to weigh the competing interests or to
assess the proportionality of the ban as it affects convicted prisoners.”78

The Court thus

concluded that the blanket ban on prisoner voting imposed in the United Kingdom breached
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.79 In light of this conclusion, it did not consider the alternative
arguments that the law breached Article 14 of the Protocol (non-discrimination), or Article 10 of
the Protocol (freedom of expression).80

III.

Comparative Analysis of International Decisions
The three recent international decisions on prisoner disenfranchisement are interesting

both for their differences and their similarities. This Part treats each in turn.

a. Differences between the International Decisions
Each of the international decisions distinguishes itself in certain regards. First, the extent
of prisoner disenfranchisement was different in each case: The provision at issue in the ECHR
case denied the vote to all convicted prisoners, irrespective of length of sentence and gravity of
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offense; the South African law denied the vote to convicted prisoners serving sentences of
imprisonment without the option of a fine; the Canadian law denied the vote to prisoners serving
sentences of two years or more. Second, South Africa was the outlier when it comes to the
justification advanced by the government for disenfranchisement. Whereas the governments in
the Canadian and European cases advanced the dual goals of preventing crime and enhancing
civic responsibility,81 the South African government’s justification was markedly different, based
on logistical and cost issues.82

Third, on the level of constitutional scrutiny, the ECHR

distinguished itself from the South African and Canadian courts; whereas those latter courts
struck down prisoner disenfranchisement based on a heightened constitutional review, the ECHR
reached the same decision with what appears to be a more relaxed level of review. Fourth, the
cases differed in the attention they accorded to the jurisprudence of other countries in the area of
prisoner disenfranchisement. Whereas the majority decision of the Canadian Supreme Court did
not use foreign or international sources at all, the other two courts conducted extensive
investigations of the state of prisoner disenfranchisement beyond their jurisdiction, notably of the
Canadian decision itself. The South African Constitutional Court analyzed the Canadian decision
for no less than seven pages; it was unquestionably informed by the decision, integrating
language from the Canadian case into its very holding.83 The ECHR preferred to place this
comparative material at the beginning of its judgment, excerpting lengthy passages from both the
majority and dissenting opinions from Sauvé 2 before beginning its analysis.84 Fifth, the cases
enjoyed differing levels of agreement among the justices.

The European decision was

unanimous, likely a reflection of the broader level of disenfranchisement at issue. The Canadian
decision came to a 5-4 vote. The South African decision enjoyed a majority of 9 votes to 2.
81

The “preventing crime” goal differed slightly in the two cases: In the European case, it was grounded in
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Finally, each court approached the constitutional test differently. The ECHR did not rule on the
legitimate ends question, finding that the disenfranchisement law failed the proportionality test.
By contrast, the South African Constitutional Court determined the ends were not compelling
(finding that accommodating the prison voters would not cause an undue resource burden) and
thus did not even carry out the proportionality analysis. Differing from both of these approaches,
the Canadian Supreme Court, after presumptively accepting the government’s stated objectives,
struck down the disenfranchisement law based on a lack of connection between the means and
ends.

b. Common Ground: The Continuum of Applicability
Perhaps more interesting and useful than the above differences are the similarities in the
three cases, decided within differing legal and social settings on three different continents. First,
despite the geographic, social, and historical differences distinguishing the three jurisdictions, all
three courts relied on a remarkably similar test of constitutional scrutiny. In each case, a
constitutional provision had to show an acceptable governmental objective, a connection had to
exist between the stated objective and the means employed, and the means had to pass both a
proportionality test and a minimum impairment test.
Second, and more importantly, the cases all attempted to view the acceptability of
prisoner disenfranchisement along a continuum. On the far end of the spectrum, it was a forgone
conclusion in each case that any continued disenfranchisement after release from prison would be
unconstitutional. Indeed, even all the dissenting opinions made this point clearly.85 Moving
along the continuum, all three courts were clear that a blanket disenfranchisement of all prisoners
which failed to account for the seriousness of their crime was unconstitutional. The distinction
between the two Canadian cases exhibits this quite clearly. In the Sauvé 1 case, a unanimous
85
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court held that a blanket disenfranchisement on all prisoners was an unconstitutional violation of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

In Sauvé 2, the Justices found a law

disenfranchising prisoners serving a sentence of two years or more also violated the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but the margin was a much closer 5-4 vote.86 Taking these two
cases together, it is clear that the Canadian Justices care very much about the length of sentence
when considering the disenfranchisement issue. There may well be some better place to draw the
line, something longer than a two year sentence, where a majority of the Justices would agree that
disenfranchisement is always appropriate.87 This is because the real question at issue in the
Canadian context is not the length of sentence but the seriousness of the crime at stake, the former
serving as a proxy for the latter. This is clear from actions of the Canadian government in the
period between the two cases, including a special governmental Commission (the Lortie
Commission) which considered prisoner disenfranchisement in depth. According to the Sauvé 2
Court:
[T]he Lortie Commission … concluded that prisoners who had been convicted of
an offence punishable by a maximum of life imprisonment and who had been
sentenced to a prison term of 10 years or more should be disqualified from voting
for the duration of their incarceration. A Special Committee on Electoral Reform,
which reviewed the Lortie Commission's Report, recommended, however, that a
two-year cutoff was appropriate since this would catch "serious offenders". [The
trial judge noted:] ‘The Special Committee spent a great deal of time trying to
determine whether a two-year limit for the disqualification was appropriate, or
whether a cutoff of five years, or seven years, or ten years (as recommended by
the Lortie Commission) was more justifiable. Eventually, the Special Committee
recommended a two-year cutoff since, in their view, serious offenders may be
considered to be those individuals who have been sentenced to a term of two
years or more in a correctional institution.’88
The Conversation between the Lortie Commission and the Special Committee on
Electoral Reform makes clear that the operative concern to be addressed in setting the minimum
prison sentence resulting in disenfranchisement was an effort to ensure that disenfranchisement
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was limited to “serious offenders.” It engaged in a detailed investigation of which cut-off point
would most effectively catch these serious offenders without being over-inclusive. This is a
difficult inquiry, and differences of opinion developed between the Lortie Commission (10 years
or more), the Special Committee on Electoral Reform (2 years or more), the majority in Sauvé 2
(2 years is over-inclusive),89 and the dissent (give deference to the 2 year standard).90 Everyone
agreed, however, on the concept of a continuum, and the importance of only catching “serious
offenders” along that continuum. Everyone agreed that disenfranchising offenders with sentences
of less than two years would be over-inclusive.
This continuum notion was also present in the ECHR decision, which seemed to test its
position along the continuum by reference to the distinction between the two Sauvé decisions in
Canada. It emphasized that although, “as the [British] Government pointed out, the [Sauvé 2]
decision was taken by five votes to four, it may be noted that this was in relation to a less
restrictive bar imposed on prisoners (those sentenced to two years or more) and that in the first
Sauvé case, concerning a blanket bar on all convicted prisoners, the decision was unanimous.
Taking due account of the difference in text and structure of the Canadian Charter, the Court
nonetheless finds that substance of the reasoning may be regarded as apposite in the present
case.”91

Against this background, the ECHR unanimously condemned the blanket

disenfranchisement at issue in the Hirst case.
The South African Court was also aware of the continuum notion. The legislation at
issue in the South African case distinguished between three kinds of prisoners: First, prisoners
who were awaiting trial were allowed to vote because of a presumption of innocence. Second,
prisoners “sentenced to a fine with the alternative of imprisonment who were in custody because
they had not paid the fine” were also allowed to vote based on the rationale that failure to pay the
fine was likely due to poverty, an unacceptable basis for disenfranchisement. Third, prisoners
89

Sauvé 2, supra note 23, at para. 54.
Id. at para. 163.
91
Hirst, supra note 63, at para. 43.
90

23

sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine were denied the right to vote.92 Although
these three levels alone could be viewed as an inclusiveness continuum, the large (9-2) majority
was unconvinced that such an approach could sufficiently solve the inclusiveness problem,
arguing that disenfranchisement of the third class of prisoners sentenced to imprisonment without
the option of a fine constituted “a blanket exclusion akin to that which failed to pass scrutiny in
the first Sauvé case.”93
Thus, in all three of the international decisions, the operative question was the
seriousness of the offense for which disenfranchisement should result. The more inclusive the
disenfranchisement law, the more minor offenses it will catch and the less likely courts have been
to find it acceptable.

Cases with blanket disenfranchisement laws received unanimous

condemnation by the courts in question, whereas laws limited to a smaller, more serious set of
offenses left those courts much more divided. This approach differs markedly from the recent
cases in U.S. Circuit courts challenging felon disenfranchisement under the Voting Rights Act.94
Whereas the VRA approach focuses on the discriminatory effects of felon disenfranchisement, all
three of the international tribunals explicitly passed up a discrimination or equality-based
inquiry.95 While the VRA approach of the Circuit Courts adds an important front against felon
disenfranchisement in the U.S., the international decisions raise the idea that another, more
inherent criticism of felon disenfranchisement should not be forgotten. The time has come to
revisit whether Ramirez’s holding is – or should be – so broad as to extend to all crimes a state
chooses to put in its felon disenfranchisement statute.
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IV.

The Transnational Judicial Discourse
a. The US Supreme Court and Transnational Judicial
Discourse

This article uses the term “transnational judicial discourse” to describe the use by one
constitutional court of case law of another constitutional court in the course of domestic
constitutional interpretation. This is a much narrower and newer question than the issue of the
relevance of international law in a given domestic system. This latter issue, in the U.S., is as old
as the Constitution itself,96 and implicates many complex subsidiary issues, such as the extent to
which customary international law applies in domestic courts,97 issues connected to the status of a
treaty as either self-executing or non-self-executing,98 the Charming Betsy cannon,99 the last in
time rule for conflicts between treaties and statutes,100 and the relationship between the
Congressional treaty power and American federalism.101 None of these issues come in to play in
the comparatively less contentious notion of a transnational judicial discourse, because the
foreign law decisions at issue in the transnational judicial discourse cannot bind the domestic
constitutional court that is considering them. Rather, the constitutional court is merely engaging
in some comparative law before getting down to the job of domestic constitutional interpretation.
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Constitutional courts worldwide are increasingly adopting this transnational judicial
discourse.102 The US Supreme Court is no exception, as was first evident in Lawrence v. Texas,
citing jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights in holding that same-sex couples have a
constitutional right to privacy.103 In Roper v. Simmons, decided last spring, the Supreme Court
engaged comparative law even more actively. In holding unconstitutional the application of
capital punishment in cases where the offender was under age eighteen at the time of the crime,
the Court cited several treaty provisions not binding on the U.S.; jurisprudence in Canada,
Britain, India, and the European Court of Human Rights; and amicus briefs from the European
Union and the Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales.104 These cases are no
accident or historical blip; in fact, six of the nine current justices have individually endorsed the
105
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Supreme Court justices are also meeting with their foreign colleagues – from national
constitutional courts and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) – with increasing regularity.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has led Supreme Court delegations to meet with their counterparts
in France, Germany and England. There have also been two official meetings between the United
States Supreme Court and the ECJ, one in 1998 in Brussels and another in 2000 in Washington.106
In a very telling move, Chief Justice Rehnquist recently created a branch of the federal judiciary
exclusively dealing with foreign policy issues, to "coordinate the federal judiciary's relationship
with foreign judiciaries and with official and unofficial agencies and organizations interested in
international judicial relations and the establishment and expansion of the rule of law and
administration of justice."107
Despite these events, the transnational judicial discourse remains controversial, and the
doubters on the court are equally vocal as the supporters. Chief among these doubters is Justice
Antonin Scalia, who is firm in his resolve that “comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task
of interpreting a constitution.”108

Justice Scalia’s view represents the concept of legal

particularism, the belief that
legal norms and institutions generally, and constitutions in particular, both
emerge from and reflect particular national circumstances, most centrally a
nation's history and political culture. In its strongest formulation, legal
particularism asserts that constitutions are important aspects of national identity.
Comparative jurisprudence is of no assistance at all, precisely because it comes
from outside a given legal system. At best, it represents a foreign curiosity of

constitutional law.”); William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts: Comparative Remarks, in Germany and its
Basic Law: Past, Present and Future, A German-American Symposium 411, 412 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald
P. Kommers eds., 1993) (“[N]ow that constitutional law is solidly ground in so many countries, it is time
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deliberative process.”)).
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27

strictly academic interest and little practical relevance. At worst, its use is a
foreign imposition or even a form of legal imperialism.109
According to the legal particularists, the transnational judicial discourse is at its best
irrelevant, and at its worst represents a dangerous threat of legal imperialism. Answering this
heavy critique requires taking a closer look at the process of transnational judicial discourse itself.
Sujit Choudhry has identified three different ways that courts use comparative
jurisprudence:

universalist

interpretation,

genealogical

interpretation,

and

dialogical

interpretation.110 On the one extreme, the universalist interpretation directly contradicts legal
particularism, premised on the belief that constitutional guarantees are transcendent, universal
concepts and that “all constitutional courts are engaged in the identification, interpretation, and
application of the same set of norms.”111 This is the slippery slope that legal particularists fear,
but this type of transnational judicial discourse is not even contemplated by any of the members
of the US Supreme Court. Occupying a middle ground, genealogical interpretation justifies
importation and application of foreign constitutional doctrines because of a proven historical link
between the two constitutions that is so strong as to properly be considered “genealogical.”112
Although this method has been used by the Canadian Supreme Court to justify the use of
American constitutional doctrine on the status and land rights of Indian nations,113 its use has
never been suggested by any of the members of the United States Supreme Court.
Finally, the least controversial form of transnational judicial discourse is dialogical
interpretation. As the name suggests, this process is nothing more than a “dialogue” a court
engages in with the other jurisprudence, respecting the constitutional boundaries so important to
the legal particularists. This non-binding dialogue can help “courts identify the normative and
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factual assumptions underlying their own constitutional jurisprudence by engaging with
comparable jurisprudence of other jurisdictions.”114 Whether the constitutional traditions at issue
are very similar or strikingly different is irrelevant to the dialogical approach, which operates
only as ‘food for thought’ before the court begins the real job of domestic constitutional
interpretation. It is this form – and only this form – of transnational judicial discourse that is
increasingly applied in the US Supreme Court.
In the recent debate between Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer on the relevance of foreign
court decisions to US Constitutional interpretation,115 Justice Breyer firmly adopted this
dialogical approach. He argued that considering foreign decisions when similar issues arise in
domestic and foreign cases could only benefit the Court because it is making use of the foreign
brain power of many constitutional court judges to flesh out all of the issues without having to be
bound by the results they reach. This answers the two chief critiques of the legal particularists.
First, the potential to flesh out issues could be quite valuable, answering the legal particularist’s
irrelevance concern.

Second, the non-binding nature of this exercise answers the legal

particularist’s ‘legal imperialism’ concern. The Court is free to take any ideas the foreign court
discussed and then treat them in its own way, using domestic constitutional tests.

b. The Transnational Judicial Discourse and Felon
Disenfranchisement
The previous section establishes that a majority of the Supreme Court is willing to engage
in the transnational judicial discourse, and that this discourse would be of the least invasive
dialogical form.

If the judges are willing to engage in such discourses, prisoner

disenfranchisement presents an ideal area to do so because of similarities of circumstances and
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constitutional tests involved. It is thus worth revisiting the conclusions drawn in Part III with an
eye towards ways the U.S. Supreme Court might benefit from the various analyses undertaken.
As discussed supra Part III(b), the over-arching theme shared by the decisions in Canada,
South Africa, and the ECHR is that prisoner disenfranchisement exists along a continuum of
acceptability with seriousness of the crime committed as the most prominent variable. Thus,
while unanimous courts in Europe and Canada found a blanket disenfranchisement unacceptable
because it punished even non-serious offenders, the Canadian Supreme Court split 5-4 on a
disenfranchisement law that only affected prisoners convicted of more serious crimes for which
the sentence was two years or greater. Similarly, the Lortie Commission in Canada had the stated
goal of disenfranchising only “serious” offenders.116 The transnational judicial discourse thus
suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court consider whether the seriousness of the crime can or should
play a more active role in the legal discourse on felon disenfranchisement.
This is not to suggest that “seriousness” has the same meaning from one legal system to
the next. Indeed, in the three different countries studied, three different proxies for seriousness
emerge. For example, in South Africa, the legislature had determined that all crimes for which
the penalty is a sentence of imprisonment without the option of a fine are necessarily serious
enough to trigger disenfranchisement. In Canada, on the other hand, the legislature determined
that all sentences of two years or more are necessarily for crimes serious enough to trigger
disenfranchisement.

Because of different sentencing practices and different applications of

criminological theory, neither of these proxies for seriousness will necessarily be appropriate in
the United States. But this does not matter in the dialogical transnational judicial discourse. All
that matters is the concept, that legislatures are likely to view certain crimes as stronger
candidates for disenfranchisement than other crimes. Perhaps in the U.S. those crimes have
unique substantive characteristics compared with the serious criteria identified in other countries.
There is no need to adopt the identical concept, because the dialogical transnational discourse
116

See supra note 88 and accompanying text.

30

only uses the idea of a continuum, not its precise framework. Adopting no more than this idea,
the next Part critically reconsiders the framers’ original intent in drafting the constitutional
provision that has become crucial to the constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement, section 2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.

V.

A Return to the U.S. Discourse on Felon
Disenfranchisement
After having established above that prisoner disenfranchisement in other jurisdictions

exists along a continuum of applicability based on the offense committed, this Part will consider
this question in the domestic context on two distinct levels. First, it will reconsider the Supreme
Court’s seminal decision in Richardson v. Ramirez with an eye to this continuum idea.
Employing the continuum notion functionally, this Part will question the understanding that the
words “or other crime” in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment were meant to affirmatively
sanction disenfranchisement for a broad range of crimes with little regard to seriousness or
substance of the crime itself. It will answer this question by a review of legislative history of the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, showing that the crimes contemplated by the Framers
were only those existing in a very particularized, narrow section of the overall continuum of
crimes. Thus, although the question comes from the continuum notion developed from foreign
materials, the answer comes wholly from a domestic source, the legislative history of the
Framers. Second, the Part then considers the notion of a continuum substantively, envisioning
what a U.S. Continuum of applicability of felon disenfranchisement would look like without the
affirmative sanction now believed to exist in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

a. A Functional Use of the Continuum: Returning to
Ramirez

31

Ever since Richardson v. Ramirez, the constitutional posture of felon disenfranchisement
in the United States has differed markedly from other “first generation” voting rights issues.
Whereas the Supreme Court’s seminal cases concerning the denial of the vote based on
education,117 property,118 and wealth119 involved the classic ends-means constitutional scrutiny we
have come to expect from equal protection decisions, Richardson relied on a decidedly different,
textual, argument. This textual argument focused on § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a
provision concerning apportionment of congressional representation:
[W]hen the right to vote ... is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state,
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of
age in such state.120
Based on this language, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution thus provided an
“affirmative sanction” for felon disenfranchisement, foreclosing the need for an equal protection
inquiry.121 In so doing, the Supreme Court closed the door to any form of means-ends equal
protection scrutiny, resting its decision wholly, and delicately, on the three words “or other
crime.” It did not consider the seriousness of the crime leading to disenfranchisement in any
level of detail.
The Ramirez majority’s reliance on Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a
constraint on Section 1 is open to question. As Marshall persuasively argued in dissent, the
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment is quite clear that Section 2 “was not intended
and should not be construed to be a limitation on the other sections of the Fourteenth
117
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Amendment.”122 Rather, it was included to provide a “special remedy -- reduced representation -to cure a particular form of electoral abuse -- the disenfranchisement of Negroes. There is no
indication that the framers of the provisions intended that special penalty to be the exclusive
remedy for all forms of electoral discrimination.”123 Although scholars after Ramirez have
continued to make this point persuasively,124 it is problematic in that it amounts to re-litigating
Ramirez all over again on the exact argument the majority already considered and rejected.
Even with new members on the Court, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would overrule
its former precedent without some changed circumstances or new argument; this is all the more
true since the Ramirez argument is a textual one based on the intent of the framers, not something
potentially subject to an evolving interpretation.125
Rather than attempting re-litigate Ramirez on the same arguments that failed the first time
around – however strong those arguments may appear – it is time for commentators and courts
alike to broaden their inquiry. It is at just this brainstorming stage when a dialogical comparative
law analysis can be the most useful: By looking to similar litigation abroad, we can gain ideas
potentially testable in the domestic setting. This proves true in the present case: This article’s
comparative law analysis has shown that international decisions on prisoner disenfranchisement
focus on the nature of the crime when subjecting the practice to constitutional scrutiny, making
this a central element of their proportionality analysis. It has, in fact, been so central to the
analyses of the international courts that they chose to forego equality and discrimination analysis
122
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altogether.126 Without adopting any of those courts’ conclusions or legal tests (the fear of the
legal particularists), an approach emphasizing a dialogical transnational judicial discourse merely
adopts the idea of considering the nature of the crime in interpreting the Constitution’s textual
reference. It then proceeds to traditional methods of constitutional interpretation, in this case an
examination of the discussions of the Framers to attempt to uncover exactly what sorts of crimes
they meant when they wrote the words “or other crime.”
This textual approach is true to the original reasoning of Ramirez, because it accepts that
the explicit mention of “crime” in Section 2 places a limit on the equal protection analysis of
felon disenfranchisement under Section 1. Rather than taking issue with the linkage between
Section 1 and Section 2 like the Ramirez dissent, it relies on this linkage like the Ramirez
majority. It then shifts the focus to developing a more nuanced understanding of just what the
Framers meant by “other crime” in Section 2.

b. Re-Examining the Legislative History
It is generally accepted that we know nothing about the Framer’s original intent in
writing the crucial words “or other crime” in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this
light, both the majority127 and the dissent128 in Ramirez comment that very little legislative history
exists as to this phrase. Agreeing with the majority on the lack of legislative history, Justice
Marshall notes in dissent that “the proposed § 2 went to a joint committee containing only the
phrase ‘participation in rebellion’ and emerged with ‘or other crime’ inexplicably tacked on.”129
The only cited basis for this understanding of the legislative history, however, is a footnote in a

126

See supra notes 36, 57, 80, and accompanying text.
Ramirez, supra note 1, at 43 (“The legislative history bearing on the meaning of the relevant language of
§ 2 is scant indeed; the framers of the Amendment were primarily concerned with the effect of reduced
representation upon the States, rather than with the two forms of disenfranchisement which were exempted
from that consequence by the language with which we are concerned here.”).
128
Id. at 72-73.
129
Id. at 73.
127

34

law review note published the preceding year,130 but that law review note’s analysis of the
legislative history is incorrect. In that note, Howard Itzkowitz and Lauren Oldak stated that the
proposed Section 2 began as House Resolution 51, and “was sent to a Joint Committee with the
phrase ‘participation in rebellion,’ [but without the words “or other crime”].”131 According to
Itzkowitz and Oldak’s version of events, it was not until the bill re-emerged from Committee as
House Resolution 127 six weeks later that the words “or other crime” first appeared.132 A careful
reading of the legislative history, however, shows that several different versions of House
Resolution 51 were printed for further consideration in committee,133 including one specifically
invoking the word “crime.”134
On March 12, 1866, Senator Grimes’ proposed version of House Resolution 51 contained
an exceptions clause worded “except for crime or disloyalty.”135 Thus, contrary to conventional
understanding, the key word “crime” was proposed before H.R. 51 ever went to the “black box”
of the Joint Committee. This is significant because the whole text of the plenary discussions has
been preserved, and it is thus possible to fully investigate what Senator Grimes was reaching for
in proposing this precise language. In this regard, Grimes stated that he had “taken it from a
proposition submitted by a distinguished Representative from the House of Representatives, Mr.
Broomall.”136

An examination of Representative Broomall’s earlier interventions leaves

absolutely no room for doubt that Mr. Broomall understood the word “crime” in this context to
refer to crimes of disloyalty related to the recent rebellion. He stated:
By the doctrine laid down by all the writers upon public law, … [the victor in
civil war] may treat its opponents either as citizens or public enemies, may hang
for treason or hold as prisoners of war. … The question of citizenship of its
opponents is for it to decide. If I am right in all this, then it is for the
130
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Government to elect whether or not it will hereafter treat the rebels as citizens or
banish them as alien enemies. … A question might naturally arise whether we
ought again to trust those who have once betrayed us. … Yet the spirit of
forgiveness is so inherent in the American bosom that no party in the country
proposes to withhold from these people the advantages of citizenship. … Some
public legislative act is necessary to show the world that those who have forfeited
all claims upon the Government … are to be welcomed back as the prodigal son
whenever they are ready to return as the prodigal son. The act under
consideration … embrace[s] the late rebels, and it gives them the rights,
privileges, and immunities of citizens of the United States, though it does not
propose to exempt them from punishment for their past crimes.137
Read in context, it is clear that the “past crimes” to which Broomall refers are crimes of
rebellion, in particular treason. Without mentioning any other crimes, Broomall makes specific
mention to treason on five more occasions in his speech138 before concluding with this language:
“All parties agree that the people of these States, being thus disorganized for all State purposes,
are still, at the election of the Government, citizens of the United States, and as such, as far as
they have not been disqualified by treason, ought to be allowed to form their own State
governments.”139
After Senator Grimes’ proposal for H.R. 51, incorporating Broomall’s “crimes” language,
Senator Wilson and Senator Sumner each individually submitted competing proposals with
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exclusion clauses limited to rebellion.140 All of these proposals were ordered to be printed for
consideration in committee. With these three proposals on the table, it is entirely feasible that the
committee’s final wording “rebellion or other crime” was an attempt to combine them. Thus,
although Itzkowitz and Oldak were wrong in some of the specifics in their Note relied on by the
Ramirez court, they are completely correct that “the thrust of [the Art. 2] language was to limit
governmental activity by former rebels.”141
In summary, modern analyses of the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment,
such as that carried out by the Ramirez court, fail to dig deep enough. Faced with the phrase
“rebellion or other crime,” they are quick to conclude that the disjunctive phrase signifies
opposition between acts constituting rebellion and acts constituting the other crimes. Read in
context of the legislative discussions taking place at the time, it becomes clear that this is not the
case. The Fourteenth Amendment was drafted after an unforgettable rebellion of the highest
magnitude. In the context in which it was drafted, it seemed hardly necessary to define “crime”
any further. As the excerpted portion of Representative Broomall’s intervention makes clear, the
“other crime” at issue in addition to rebellion was treason. The phrase “rebellion or other crime”
should be interpreted in the proper historical light to mean what the Framers intended: “rebellion
or other crime of disloyalty.” Thus, the continuum notion has relevance in the domestic setting,
because the Framers were considering only a very specific set of crimes when they drafted the
exceptions clause in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

c. Means-End Constitutional Scrutiny: A First Attempt
By a close examination of the legislative history read in its proper context, we thus
emerge from the original textual premise of Ramirez. Properly contextualized, the reference to
“crime” in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a narrow exception for rebellion and
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treason, not a show-stopping affirmative sanction of general felon disenfranchisement. The
question of felon disenfranchisement should therefore be treated like other first-generation voting
rights issues, subject to means-ends equal protection scrutiny.

Fortunately, we already have

guidance on what this analysis would look like, because Justice Marshall reached the
constitutional scrutiny analysis in his Ramirez dissent after dismissing the majority’s section 2
textual argument on the basis that section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment related to the specific
issue of representative apportionment and was not meant to control section 1.142
In his equal protection analysis, Justice Marshall relied on the large jurisprudence of
voting rights cases establishing voting as a fundamental right.143

Reasoning that this case

presented a similar limitation on the franchise, he concluded that strict scrutiny was the
appropriate standard of review.144 Marshall noted that the State put forth two state interests:
preventing voter fraud and preventing felons from voting as a group to “repeal or emasculate
provisions of the criminal code.”145 Marshall quickly dispersed with the latter interest, noting that
the Court had “explicitly held that … ‘differences of opinion cannot justify excluding [any] group
from . . . the franchise.’”146 As to the first interest of preventing voter fraud, Marshall noted that
felon disenfranchisement was both over-inclusive and under-inclusive to meet this end. Felon
disenfranchisement was over-inclusive because it “is not limited to those who have demonstrated
a marked propensity for abusing the ballot by violating election laws. Rather, it encompasses all
former felons and there has been no showing that ex-felons generally are any more likely to abuse
the ballot than the remainder of the population.”147 It was under-inclusive because “many of
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those convicted of violating election laws are treated as misdemeanants and are not barred from
voting at all.”148
Finding neither of the proposed interests persuasive, Marshall concluded that “the State
has not met its burden of justifying the blanket disenfranchisement of former felons presented by
this case.”149

d. Looking Ahead: A Broader Examination of the
Continuum
This Part began with a procedural application of the continuum of applicability concept.
Having established the presence of a continuum internationally, it applied the idea of a continuum
domestically by questioning whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment meant the words
“or other crime” to sweep as broadly as they have been interpreted. By examining the original
legislative history of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, this Part has answered that
question in the negative. This final section now considers an altogether different application of
the continuum; whereas the original application was procedural, giving reason to reconsider the
meaning of a textual reference, this application is substantive, attempting to envision, based on
the new information uncovered in the legislative history, what a continuum of applicability of
felon disenfranchisement would look like.
Envisioning such a continuum of applicability for felon disenfranchisement is a difficult
task. Because of the Supreme Court’s original textual mistake in Ramirez, discussed above, the
continuum which can be distilled from the current case law is based on rational basis, not strict
scrutiny. In an article comparing disenfranchisement and employment discrimination of former
felons,150 Elena Saxonhouse outlines the existing continuum under this rational basis approach.
First, the Supreme Court has held that felon disenfranchisement laws passed with racially
148
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discriminatory intent will not withstand constitutional scrutiny.151 Second, a lower court has held
that "no rational basis [exists] to preclude the registration of [former felons] who were
incarcerated within the last five years and who had not registered previously, when those who
were legally registered prior to incarceration may vote upon their release.”152 Third, a federal
district court has held that Section 2's affirmative sanction of felon disenfranchisement is
inapplicable to misdemeanants.153

Fourth, a district court has held that a state may not

"haphazardly pick and choose" disqualifying crimes.154 Fifth, a district court has held that felon
disenfranchisement laws may not discriminate based on sex.155
Thus, even under rational basis scrutiny, a continuum of applicability of felon
disenfranchisement has begun to emerge in the United States. First, disenfranchisement statutes
passed with racially discriminatory intent are definitely unconstitutional.

Second,

disenfranchisement statutes which blatantly discriminate based on other factors, such as sex, are
also suspect. Third, disenfranchisement for misdemeanors is highly questionable under any
reading of the legislative history of section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and reconstruction
acts.156
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Importantly, however, this continuum is based on holdings premised on the belief that
Ramirez allows for, at most, rational basis scrutiny of felon disenfranchisement.157 As this article
has argued,158 the legislative history of section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was
misinterpreted by the Ramirez court and that section thus should not operate as a barrier to the
Court’s traditional strict scrutiny for voting as a fundamental right. In this light, the continuum of
applicability would likely shift significantly. Because Justice Marshall adopted strict scrutiny in
his Ramirez dissent, his contribution again becomes significant.

Applying strict scrutiny,

Marshall adopts a continuum of acceptability in which certain serious crimes or voting-specific
crimes could justify disenfranchisement, but other crimes could not.159 As Marshall wrote:
To say that § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a direct limitation on the
protection afforded voting rights by § 1 leads to absurd results. If one accepts
the premise that § 2 authorizes disenfranchisement for any crime, the challenged
California provision could, as the California Supreme Court has observed,
require disenfranchisement for seduction under promise of marriage, or
conspiracy to operate a motor vehicle without a muffler. Disenfranchisement
extends to convictions for vagrancy in Alabama or breaking a water pipe in
North Dakota, to note but two examples. Even a jaywalking or traffic conviction
could conceivably lead to disenfranchisement, since § 2 does not differentiate
between felonies and misdemeanors.160
Consistent with all the international decisions’ majorities and dissents,161 Marshall
concludes that disenfranchisement of former felons who have completely served their sentence is
unjustifiable.162 It is important for legal particularists to note that Marshall reached this decision
decades before the international decisions discussed in this article, and he reached it solely on the
basis of traditional U.S. Constitutional interpretation. Claims of “legal imperialism” in the
context of the transnational judicial discourse are difficult to sustain in light of the fact that
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disenfranchisement statutes).
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See supra notes 127-141 and accompanying text.
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Marshall’s equal protection analysis came out almost identical to the international decisions,
decades before those opinions were even written.
Ultimately, a continuum of applicability of felon disenfranchisement will be for the
courts to define on a case by case basis, once the current textual road-block gives way to a
nuanced constitutional balancing process. But, we can begin to speculate. First, Underwood
would still stand at the far end of the continuum, barring any disenfranchisement statute passed
with racially discriminatory intent. Second, the disenfranchisement of former felons would be
extremely difficult to justify when the absence of any textual “affirmative sanction” for felon
disenfranchisement is combined with a strict scrutiny approach. But, whereas Justice Marshall in
Ramirez believed all former felons should be re-enfranchised under strict scrutiny, my reading of
the legislative history would still affirmatively sanction disenfranchisement of former felons who
had committed one of a narrow set of crimes related to rebellion, such as treason. Third, under a
strict scrutiny test, the somewhat controversial decisions of the lower courts discussed by
Saxonhouse are likely to find much more widespread acceptance. For example, the decision of
the Southern District of Mississippi not to disenfranchise misdemeanants163 looks quite
uncontroversial under strict scrutiny, because the punishment is not narrowly tailored to the
crime. But, these cases all fall relatively far to one side of the continuum. If the courts reexamine the intention of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and debunk the affirmative
sanction currently supporting felon disenfranchisement, the most difficult and important question
they will face is for what crimes the practice is justifiable under narrow tailoring and
proportionality analysis. They may conclude that the franchise, as a “fundamental political right
… preservative of all rights,”164 always comes out on top in proportionality analysis, except for
crimes of rebellion such as treason. On the other hand, they could plausibly conclude that certain
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See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
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crimes related to voting or crimes involving a high degree of moral turpitude are serious enough
to satisfy proportionality and related closely enough to voting to satisfy narrow tailoring.
In conclusion, even with the textual understanding that section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment affirmatively sanctions felon disenfranchisement, a continuum of applicability of the
practice has begun to develop in the lower courts. If courts would accept the argument presented
in this article, limiting the affirmative textual sanction to crimes of rebellion such as treason, the
continuum of applicability would both strengthen and shift. The continuum would strengthen
because rather than relying on a supposed textual sanction, courts would confront the issue and
test the appropriateness of felon disenfranchisement in light of all the potential challenges to the
practice that come on to their docket. The continuum would shift because strict scrutiny would
provide a much more stringent paradigm within which to justify felon disenfranchisement. Under
such a paradigm, the side of the continuum allowing felon disenfranchisement would likely be
limited to three narrow areas. First, disenfranchisement for crimes involving rebellion or treason
would be affirmatively sanctioned by the text of section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, by a similar rationale, disenfranchisement for crimes involving disloyalty in voting may
be legitimate. Finally, disenfranchisement for crimes involving an extremely high level of moral
turpitude may (or may not) prove serious enough to satisfy proportionality.

VI.

Conclusion

After years of dormancy, the debate over felon disenfranchisement in the U.S. is alive
again under the rubric of the Voting Rights Act. Although the Voting Rights Act represents a
valuable tool for those attempting to challenge felon disenfranchisement laws, this article
questions whether it should be the only tool.

Limiting judicial challenges of felon

disenfranchisement to Section 2 the VRA suggests that it is only discriminatory outcomes which
make felon disenfranchisement problematic, not the potentially inherent injustice of the practice.
Since the Supreme Court held in Ramirez three decades ago that the Constitution affirmatively
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sanctioned felon disenfranchisement, however, there has seemed little hope of resurrecting a
constitutional argument as to the inherently problematic nature of the practice. Comparative law
provides an idea to suggest this original textual premise be re-examined. In all three of the recent
international cases discussed in this article, the courts placed a heavy emphasis on viewing
prisoner disenfranchisement along a continuum of acceptability with the nature of the offense as
the major variable. With this idea in mind, this article has examined the original intent of the
Framers to determine if the phrase “or other crime” was as broad as the Ramirez Court interpreted
it. Comparative law operates in this dialogical way not to import a foreign test or doctrine, but
rather to generate an idea which is then tested using conventional domestic tools of Constitutional
interpretation. Interestingly, it appears that, like the international context, the Framers also
viewed disenfranchisement along a continuum, intending the phrase “or other crime” to apply
only to crimes of rebellion or disloyalty to the state, such as treason. If this is true, then in the
case of crimes other than rebellion and treasion, it is appropriate to proceed to the equal
protection analysis. Because Justice Marshall in his Ramirez dissent reached the equal protection
analysis through another route, we already have an idea of what that analysis would look like.
Marshall found in Ramirez that neither the state interests of preventing voter fraud nor of
preventing felon group voting was compelling enough to disenfranchise former felons who have
completely served their sentence, quite safe territory along the continuum of applicability. The
final section of the article attempts to go beyond Marshall’s analysis, proposing a generalized
continuum of applicability for felon disenfranchisement in the United States. Beginning with the
existing continuum under rational basis scrutiny and the Ramirez understanding of the legislative
history, it concludes by extrapolating to the future strict scrutiny paradigm.
For better or worse, we live in a world where a few prisoners in Florida, if allowed to
vote, could determine the election of the most powerful person on earth.

Felon

disenfranchisement is definitely not a novel or merely academic question. It is a serious question,
not only for its potential to alter elections; not only for it potential to operate in a discriminatory
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manner; not only for the interplay between felon disenfranchisement, prison location, and
redistricting. All of these reasons are important, but this article attempts to suggest another: we
should care about felon disenfranchisement because it inherently contradicts the rest of our
constitutional jurisprudence on the right of every citizen to vote. This article has suggested that it
is time to re-examine the original textual premise of the Ramirez decision that section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment affirmatively sanctions felon disenfranchisement.

Reviewing the

legislative history of the framers, it argues that strict scrutiny is appropriate for felon
disenfranchisement for the vast majority of crimes except those related to rebellion or disloyalty
to the state, such as treason. It concludes by suggesting some indication of what a continuum of
applicability of felon disenfranchisement might look like under strict scrutiny. Of course, a full
constitutional dialogue under strict scrutiny will be a nuanced and laborious process, the work of
judges and legislatures; but, if this article has clearly emphasized the need to revisit that
constitutional dialogue, it has done its job.
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